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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, CONFLICT OF LAWS
AND THE CONSTITUTION
CLYDE W. WELLEN*
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
A. Personal Injury at Common Law
At common law an employee could maintain an action for
injuries incident to his employment only if he could establish that
his employer had been negligent. His action could then be de-
feated by the employer, if the employer could show contributory
negligence, assumption of risk by the workman, or that a fellow
servant had contributed to the injury. Under workmen's compen-
sation acts these defenses are not available to the employer.1  An
employer is charged with injuries arising out of his business without
regard to any question of his negligence, or that of the injured
employee. 2 Workmen's compensation is thus a form of strict liabili-
ty. A source of much litigation has thereby been removed, but
many new problems have been created by these statutes. One of
the most difficult of these problems relates to the conflict of laws.
Under the common law system the employee's remedy for
injuries connected with the employment was in tort. In such
actions it was the well established rule of conflict of laws that
reference should be made to the lex loci delicti to determine the
rights of the parties. If the law of the place of tort gave a cause
of action it could be maintained in the courts of any state, unless
against the public policy of the forum. This was true even though
a cause of action would not arise from the same facts under the
laws of the forum. It was equally true that if the lex loci delicti
gave the plaintiff no cause of action, he had no enforceable claim in
a second state.
B. Employer's Liability Acts
The enactment, by the states, of employer's liability acts
widened materially the scope of the employee's possible recovery
through the abolition of the common law fellow servant and as-
Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston, Houston, Texas.
1 For a collection of the statutes in the United States accompanied by
brief annotations see DIGEST OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWs (16th ed. 1939).
2 1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COIPENSATION TEXT § 3 (3d perm. ed. 1941).
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sumption of risk rules; but the basic principles of responsibility in
tort were left unchanged in that, in order to recover, the employee
was obliged to show fault on the part of his employer. The rules
provided by the employer's liability acts, like the common law rules,
sounded in tort; and the courts treated them, from the point of view
of conflict of laws, as they did other questions of tort.
II. EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTES
A. Choice of Law in the Absence of Express Statutory Provision
1: Tort theory:
The early workmen's compensation statutes usually contained
no provisions concerning their application to extraterritorial acci-
dents, so the duty of determining the conditions under which the
local act should be applied to injury in another state devolved upon
the courts. A few of the early cases construing the compensation
acts held that workmen's compensation was merely a substitute for
tort liability and that the law of the place of injury should deter-
mine the rights of the parties.3  Such a narrow construction, limit-
ing the coverage of the local statute to injuries occurring within the
borders of the state, did not seem consonant with the purpose of
the compensation law, and since the concept of fault or wrongful
injury was entirely absent from the acts, it was held that liability
under the acts was not delictual.4
2: Contract theory:
The courts, desiring to give the statutes a broader effect, turned
to the alternative common law theory of contract., Rights to com-
pensation benefits were considered contractual rights involving
conflict of law principles derived from the subject of contracts
generally. In accordance with these principles, the rights of the
employee in the event of injury is determined by the lex loci con-
tractus, which in workmen's compensation cases is the place where
the parties enter into the contract of employment.0 If the contract
3 North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 162 Pac. 93 (1916);
Union Bridge & Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 287 Ill. 396, 122 N.E.
609 (1919); In re Gould, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N.E. 693 (1913).
4 Statutes have changed the rule in the states which held rights under the
acts to be in tort: CAL. STATS. 381 (1917); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 48, § 142 (Smith-
Hurd, 1929); MASS. CUAL. STAT. C. 152, § 26 (Supp. 1939).
5 See Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Law, 11 MINN.
L. REv. 329 (1927); Dunlap, The Conflict of Laws and Workmen's Compensation,
23 CALur. L. REv. 381 (1935).
6 Falvey v. Sprague Meter Co., 111 Conn. 693, 151 Ad. 182 (1930); Culla-
more v. Groneweg & Schoentgen, 219 Iowa 200, 257 N.W. 561 (1934); Hi-Heat
Gas Co. v. Dickerson, 113 N.J.L. 329, 174 At. 483 (1934).
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of employment is made in a state providing for workmen's compen-
sation as an incident of such contract, it is said that incident should
follow the employee wherever he goes within the scope of his em-
ployment, whether the contract is to be performed within the state
in whole or in part or actually outside its bounds.7 This principle
affords a facile means for justifying the extraterritorial application
of compensation acts. Conversely, it tends in some cases to carry
compensation acts far beyond the sphere in which the state has a
legitimate interest to conserve in applying them.
In addition to these practical considerations, there are many
theoretical difficulties inherent in the application of ordinary con-
tract principles to workmen's compensation. Where a compensa-
tion act specifically refers to the right to compensation benefits as a
statutory annexation to the contract of employment, it is more or
less natural for the courts to regard this right as a right of contract
and to settle questions of conflict of laws on that basis. Compen-
sation acts, however, are of two types. They are either elective or
compulsory.8 When the act is compulsory in character, there is no
element of contract in coming within its terms. The incidence of
workmen's compensation is appurtenant to the employment whether
the parties wish it or not. Even where the acts are elective courts
have found it difficult to interpret them as ordinary contracts. If
the obligation to pay compensation is contractual, its terms will
necessarily be governed by requirements in force at the time when
the employment began, and the law could not be amended as
against existing contracts in a way which would impair the contract
within the meaning of the term as used in the Constitution. 9 No
case has been found which so limits the effect of the statutes. Like-
wise the claim for compensation has been held not to be con-
tractual within the statute of limitations. 1° Once under the act, it
is the law and not the contract which governs, hence the parties
may not freely modify its terms.1
7 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 398 (1934). See Dwan, supra note 5,
at 337.
s For a comparative table of the various state acts and the extent to which
they are elective, see DicEsr OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 10, Introduction
(16th ed. 1939).
9 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 10, (1).
10 Davidson v. Payne, 281 Fed. 544 (D.C. Kan. 1922), 21 MIcH. L. REv. 449
(1923).
11 Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 169 Wis. 106, 170 N.W. 275 (1919).
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3: Other theories of extraterritoriality developed by the courts:
It may be seen from these observations that workmen's com-
pensation problems cannot be solved by the application of orthodox
conflicts principles. The obligation to pay compensation is neither
a substitute for older tort liability, nor is it purely contractual, but
it is a statutory regulation of the relation of employer and employee
based upon the interest of the state in the protection of the health
and lives of its citizens. Recognizing this the courts in several
states, even in the absence of statutory provisions, have developed
conflict of laws principles more adapted to workmen's compensa-
tion problems. The common factor in these theories is the attempt
to find some act, relation, or situation within the jurisdiction to
which the local act will attach legal consequences. Probably the
best known of these theories has been the "business localization
test" developed by the Minnesota court.1 2 The basic thought
underlying this theory is expressed as follows:
"When a business is localized in a state there is nothing
inconsistent with the principles of the compensation act in
requiring the employer to compensate for injuries incurred in
a service incident to his business sustained beyond the border
of the state. What the employer did, if done in Minnesota, was
a contribution to the business involving an expense and pre-
sumably resulting in a profit. It was not different because done
across the border in North Dakota." 1 3
In an increasing number of states, the business localization
theory is being regarded as an important factor in determining
whether the local act will be applied.1 4 A closely analogous test,
and one also receiving widespread approval, has been developed
in New York. This test places the emphasis upon the location of
the employment, however, rather than upon the location of the
employer's business.' 5 The distinction between the two theories
12 See State ex rel. Chambers v. District Court of Hennepin County, 189
Minn. 205, 166 N.W. 185 (1918); cf. De Rosier v. Jay W. Craig Co., 217 Minn.
296, 14 N.W.2d 286, 28 MINN. L. Rzv. 885 (1944); Ginsburg v. Blyers, 117 Minn.
366, 214 N.W. 55 (1927).
13 Chambers v. Hennepin County, 139 Minn. 205, 209, 166 N.W. 185, 187
(1918).
14 Smith v. Menzies Shoe Co., 98 Ind. App. 182, 188 N.E. 592 (1934);
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R. v. Lindquist, 206i Iowa 449, 221 N.W. 228
(1928); Durrett v. Eicher-Woodland Lumber Co., 19 La. App. 494, 186 So. 112
(1931); Watts v. Long, 116 Neb. 656, 218 N.W. 410, 59 A.L.R.128 (1928).
15 Smith v. Aerovane Utilities Corp., 259 N.Y. 126, 181 N.E. 72 (1928).
Compare Matter of Proper v. Polley, 259 N.Y. 516, 182 N.E. 161 (1932), with
Matter of Whitmire v. Blaw-Knox Construction Co., 263 N.Y. 675, 189 N.E. 758
(1934).
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may be illustrated by considering the New York case of Cameron
v. Ellis Construction Co.' There the employer was constructing a
road in New York. The employee was employed only for work in
Canada, where the injury occurred in a sand pit operated solely
to provide sand and gravel for the New York road. Compensation
under the New York Act was denied since the regular place of em-
ployment was in Canada. In Minnesota a different result would
probably have been reached under these facts, since the employer's
business was localized within the state in which compensation was
being sought.
The New York rule has much to commend it. The state's
direct concern is a regulation of employment within its borders.
It is not the fact that the employee or employer resides within the
state, or that the employee was hired there, but the fact that the
two are within the state in a relation which the state may have an
interest in regulating. That relation may entail work outside the
state, and if that work be properly incidental to the relation exist-
ing within the state, the state has a sound reason for extending
its regulation to such work. But when the employer and employee
carry on work in another state which may fairly be said to be
localized there, the state's interest diminishes, and the other state's
interest is superior. There is, to be sure, a no-man's land between
outside operations clearly transitory and incidental, and outside
operations fixed in time and location. As compared with the pit-
falls inherent in the contract theory, however, this defect is neg-
ligible, and a way to avert even this difficulty has been pointed
out by the Wisconsin court in Wandersee v. Meskowitz.1r In that
case it was held that a constructive status as employee was created
under the Wisconsin Act until the workman acquired an actual
status as an employee in some other state. While admitting this
constructive status may be fictional, it was said to be justified in
that it assured the employee of coverage under the act of at least
one state.""
B. Express Statutory Provisions for Extraterritoriality
As workmen's compensation statutes have been developed and
their coverage made more complete, there has been an attempt to
,a 252 N.Y. 394, 169 N.E. 622 (1930).
3.7 198 Wis. .345, 233 N.W. 837 (1929).
is In Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Gerard, 201 Wis. 474, 230 N.W. 622 (1930),
the application of this doctrine was limited to employees who were residents
of the state.
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make them more explicit concerning their extraterritorial applica-
tion. The provisions in the statutes, however, show the same
diversity as did the decisions of the courts in the absence of statu-
tory provisions. In thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia,
and Hawaii, the statutes expressly provide for extraterritorial appli-
cation. 19 In seven of these states and the District of Columbia it
is merely provided that the statutes shall apply to extrastate injury
if the injured employee comes within the coverage of the statute. 20
Because of this indefiniteness, the courts in these jurisdictions have
been forced to create and apply their own conditions for extra-
territoriality. Connecticut and Massachusetts regard the place
where the contract of employment is made as decisive for this pur-
pose,21 while Indiana, Ohio and the District of Columbia hold
that the law of the place where the contract of employment is to be
performed should control.2 2  In the other states having statutes
dealing with this problem, the statutes contain more specific re-
quirements for extrastate application, viz., that the contract of hire
must have been made within the state2  or that the status of em-
ployee must be maintained and localized within the state,24 or that
19 These states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont.
Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming. For a collection of these provisions see
DiGEsT or WoRmEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS. (16th ed. 1939 with cum. supp.).
20 The states having such provisions are Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana,
Iowa, Massachusetts, Ohio and South Dakota.
21 Falvey v. Sprague Meter Co., Ill Conn. 693, 151 At. 182 (1930); Wright's
Case, 291 Mass. 334, 197 N.E. 5 (1935).
22 Fischer v. Mossman-Yarnelle Co., 105 Ind. App. 22, 13 N.E.2d 343 (1938);
Industrial Comm'n v. Gardinio, 119 Ohio St. 539, 164 N.E. 758 (1929); United
States Casualty Co. v. Hoage, 77 F.2d 542 (App. D.C. 1935).
23This is a condition for extraterritorial application in Alabama, Cali.
fornia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, New
Hampshire, Missouri, Michigan, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, and Virginia.
24 These states are: Maryland, Oregon, Pennsylvania and West Virginia.
In Maryland and West Virginia the statutes apply extraterritorially only if the
employee's absence from the state is temporary and incidental to his employment
within the state. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101. § 80 (3) (Flack, 1939); W. VA. CODE §
2511 (Michie, 1949). Pennsylvania limits the application of its statute to
employees not absent from the state for more than ninety days. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 77 § I (Purdon Perm. ed.). As a further restriction, the Oregon act extends
its coverage to out of state injuries only of the act of another state is not
applicable. ORE. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 102-1731 (1940).
6
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either,25 or both,20 of these conditions must coexist at the time of
injury. Delaware alone expressly limits the applicability of its
statute to injuries occurring within the state.2 7 Eleven states, 28
Alaska, and Puerto Rico have no express provisions in their
statutes concerning extraterritoriality. Most of these statutes, how-
ever, provide that every person under the service of another under
contract of hire within the state shall come within the coverage of
the act.29  Construction of this provision has produced results
basically the same as in those states with express provision for
extraterritoriality.3 1
III. APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF THE STATE OF INJURY
A. Compensation Statutes
The converse of the question just considered is whether the
local compensation act, or possibly the local common law governs
an injury within the state when the employment is located in an-
other state. This will involve first a determination of whether the
employee comes within the provisions of the compensation statute
of the state where the injury occurred. If it be decided that he is
21; The states providing for extraterritorial coverage in case either the con-
tract of employment, or the regular employment is within the state are:
Arizona, Colorado, Mississippi, Utah, and Wyoming.
20 Nevada is the only state having this strict requirement. NEv. Como'.
LAws §' 2723 (Hillyer, 1929). The parties may elect to come within the Nevada
statute, however, where the employment is wholly or partially without the
state, even though the contract of hire is made outside the state.
7- DEL. REV. CODE c. 175, art. 6.071 (1935).
2 Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin.
29 For a collection of these provisions see DI.FSr WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS (16th ed. 1939 with cum. supp.).
:0 A number of these states have applied the business localization theory
discussed supra note 15. These states are: Louisiana: Durrett v. Eicher-
Woodland Lumber Co.. 19 La. App. 494, 136 So. 112 (1930); Minnesota:
Chambers v. District Court of Hennepin County, 139 Minn. 205, 166 N.W. 185
(1918); Nebraska: Watts v. Long, 116 Neb. 656, 218 N.W. 410, 59 A.L.R. 728
(1928). New York permits its act to apply to outside injuries if the regular
employment is within the state. Industrial Accident Board v. Tallman, 259
N.Y. 512, 182 N.E. 159 (1932); Matter of Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co., 252
N.Y. 394, 169 N.E. 622 (1930); see supra p. 134, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
and Washington seem to approve no one theory for extraterritoriality. Miller
v. National Chair Co., 127 N.J.L. 414, 22 A.2d 804 (1941); Grinnel v. Wilkinson,
39 R.I. 447, 98 At. 103 (1916); Industrial Accident Board v. Thompson, 192
Wash. 501, 73 P.2d 1320 (1937). For the view in Wisconsin, compare Val Blatz
Brewing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 Wis. 474, 230 N.W. 622 (1930), with
Schooley v. Industrial Comm'n, 233 Wis. 631, 290 N.W. 127 (1941).
The Oklahoma act has been held not to apply to any out of state injuries.
197 Okla. 618, 173 P.2d 922 (1946); Continental Oil Co. v. Pitts, 158 Okla. 200,
13 P.2d 180 (1932).
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not so covered, then the question arises whether the local common
law or employer's liability act is applicable. The applicability of the
local compensation act will first be considered.
Where some of the incidents of the employment, in addition
to mere transitory employment, are present within the state where
the injury occurred, its laws may be applied under one of the
theories discussed above. If, however, the employee's work within
the state, at the time of injury, was merely transitory and incidental
to his employment elsewhere, justification for the application of the
local law must be found on other grounds. With respect to this
question, three state statutes have provisions expressly providing
for their applicability to all injuries occurring within the state, with-
out regard to the place of hiring, or of regular employment.-'
Conversely, in four states it is expressly provided that an employee
hired in another state shall be entitled to compensation under the
laws of the state where the contract arose and not under the domes-
tic law.8 2 But in two of these states, the provision has been con-
strued as applying only to cases where injury occurred outside the
state.33 In the remainder of the states, i.e., those having no, or only
partial statutory provisions, various tests have been used to deter-
mine whether the local law applies to an injury occurring within
the state. Consistency in applying the contract theory of extra-
territoriality would prevent the application of the law of the state
of injury where the contract of employment was without the state,
since this theory requires that the parties look only to the law of
the place of hiring to determine their rights and liabilities.84 In
accordance with this principle, a few courts have held that the rules
governing injury within the state shall be the precise complement
of rules concerning recovery for an injury without, 5 but most
courts have not restricted the application of their statutes so nar-
rowly. The extraterritorial effect of the laws of other states, having
31 DEL. REV. CODE. C. 175, art. 6071 (1935); Mo. REV. STArS. c. 287.110
(Vernon, 1949); PENN. REV. STAT. tit. 77, § 1 (Purdon, 1939).
32 ARiz. CODE ANN. C. 56, § 943 (1939); IDAHO CODE § 72-615 (1949); UTAH
CODE ANN. tit. 42, art. 1, § 52a (1943); VT. STATS. tit. 40, c. 353, § 8074 (1947).
33 Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 32 Ariz. 775,
257 Pac. 644 (1927); Fay v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Utah 542, 114 P.2d 503
(1941).
34 Dunlap, supra note 5, at 383.
35 Hall v. Industrial Comm'n, 77 Colo. 338, 235 Pac. 1073 (1925); Hopkins
v. Matchless Metal Polish Co., 99 Conn. 475, 121 Atl. 828 (1923); Cole v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 353 Ill. 415, 187 N.E. 520 (1933); Proper v. Polley, 259 N.Y.
518, 182 N.E. 161 (1932); Leinninger v. Jacobs, 270 Mich. 1, 257 N.W. 764 (1934).
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contact with the incidents of the employment relation, has been
an important factor in determining whether the lex loci fori should
be applied to an injury within the state. Accordingly, it has been
held that relief should be denied if the forum has no contact with
the employment other than its contact as the place of injury, and
it seems clear that another state having a greater interest would
grant compensation. 8  The local act usually has been held ap-
plicable, however, where denial of relief in the forum might leave
the worker without a remedy.37 It has been suggested that another
reason influencing the courts to apply the law of the forum is the
difficulty of establishing a claim in a remote jurisdiction because
of the unavailability of witnesses.38 If, in determining the applicabil-
ity of the local act, the workers' rights under the law of another
state are ignored, it may result in great hardship. This can be
well illustrated by a recent Oregon case.3 9 Oregon denied recovery
under its law to an employee of an Oregon corporation, although
the injury occurred within the state and the contract of hire was
there. The basis for the decision was that the employee was a
resident of California, whose presence in Oregon at the time of
injury was temporary, the principal place of business being in
California. California law would not permit a recovery because
the contract of employment was made in Oregon, hence there could
be no recovery for the accident under the law of either state. In
Colorado, Ohio, and Rhode Island this problem is specifically
covered by statutory provisions making their law inapplicable to
employees hired in another jurisdiction temporarily working within
the state, if, and only if, the employer has furnished insurance for
extraterritorial employment under the law of another state.4 0
Other states having laws partially addressed to this problem are
Maryland and North Dakota.41 Maryland adds to the prerequisites
36 Hopkins v. Matchless Metal Polish Co., 99 Conn. 457, 121 Atl. 828 (1923);
Biship v. International Sugar Feed Co., 87 Ind. App. 509, 162 N.E. 71 (1928);
Brameld v. Dickinson Co., 186 Minn. 89, 242 N.W. 465 (1932).
3 United States Casualty Co. v. Hoage, 77 F.2d 542 (App. D.C. 1935);
Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 32 Ariz. 275, 257 Pac.
644 (1927); Weaver v. Missouri Compensation Comm'n, 339 Mo. 150, 95 S.W.2d
641 (1936).
38 GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF iE CONFLmr OF LAws § 100 (3d ed. 1949).
39 House v. State Industrial Accident Comm'n, 167 Ore. 259, 117 P.2d 611,
21 OaRE. L. RFv. 203 (1941).
40 COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 97, § 430 (Michie, 1941); OHIo CODE ANN. § 1465-68
(Page, 1946) (provision not applicable to residents of Ohio); R.I. LAws c. 1052,
§ 7 (1938). These provisions in the Colorado and Rhode Islands statutes also
require that the state of hiring must guarantee reciprocity.
41 MD. CODE ANN. art. 101, § 80(3) (Flack, 1939); N.D. LAws c. 252, § 1 (1939).
9
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for applicability the requirement that the employer and employee
be residents of the state. The North Dakota provision is the same
except that hiring outside the state is not required.
Two other factors must always be considered in determining
the applicability of the local act. The first is that the employer
have enough workmen employed within the state to come
within its terms. The minimum number of workmen required
to be employed within the state before its act is applicable varies
from a requirement of fifteen in South Carolina to a minimum of
one, which is the requirement in a number of states. If this
minimum number of employees is not present within the state, the
injured employee will not qualify for benefits under the local act.
Another important consideration is that of jurisdiction of the
parties. If the only interest of the employer, within the state in
which his employee is injured, is transitory and incidental to his
business localized elsewhere, it may be impossible for the employee
to secure service of process on his employer to prosecute his claim
within the state though he might otherwise qualify under the local
act. The acts contain no special provisions for securing service of
process upon out-of-state employers, so, to obtain jurisdiction it
would be necessary to serve the employer, or one of his agents
upon whom service of process might be made, within the state.
B. Common Law
If it be determined, for one or another of the above reasons,
that the local compensation act is inapplicable, then the employee's
only method of securing relief will be either under the compen-
sation act in the state of regular employment, or under the common
law of the state of injury. The compensation statutes are uniform
in providing that, where both the employer and employee are
under their coverage, the rights of the injured employee andi
liabilities of the employer are determined by their provisions and
an action under the common law for damages is not permitted.4 2
Many of the statutes are expressly made compulsory for employers
and employees coming within their provisions.43 Most of these
acts impose a fine or other penalty on employers who fail to com-
ply with their compulsory provisions. The usual provision is that
42 1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 90.
43 For a list of the compulsory statutes see DIEsT Or WORK-MEN'S COMI'ENSA-
TION LAWS 9, Introduction (16th ed. 1939 with cum. supp.).
10
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an employer who fails to insure his liability, or fails to make the
necessary accident or payroll reports to the commission, shall be
liable to the injured employee either under the act, or at common
law, and in such cases he is foreclosed from interposing any of the
usual common law defenses. The remainder of the acts are desig-
nated as elective, but most of these are drafted in such a way as
to make the term misleading. Under many of the so-called
elective acts, neither the employer nor employee is actually put to
an election, for acceptance of the act is presumed unless notice is
received to the contrary. In other words, the effect of the elective
features is to give those concerned a right to reject the act. Rejec-
tion of the acts, however, is often discouraged by other modifica-
tions in the common law complementing the passage of the compen-
sation statutes. For instance, if the employer rejects the act, he
is usually deprived of his common law defenses in an action by the
injured employee. If, on the other hand, rejection is by the em-
ployee, he is subject to these defenses by the employer and must
prove negligence on the part of the employer to recover. Because
of these compulsions, direct and indirect, the employee usually
comes within the coverage of the compensation statute in the
state of regular employment, and actions at common law for
injuries to the employee are thereby precluded. Where the em-
ployee leaves the state of regular employment, however, and is
temporarily working in another state when injured, the problem
is more difficult. If this temporary work is the only occurrence
within the state incident to the employment relation, the local act,
as has been seen, will frequently not be applicable, and will be no
bar to a common law action in tort by the workman against his
employer.
If the lex loci delicti gives the employee a cause of action in
tort, then the question is whether the compensation act of the
state of regular employment can be pleaded as a bar to such action.
Where it appears that the injured employee is subject to the com-
pensation act of the state where the regular employment is located,
and that act extends its coverage to extrastate injuries and is by its
terms made the exclusive remedy, the cases hold that no action
at law should be maintained, even though the injury constitutes
an actionable wrong under the lex loci delicti."4 Indeed, Art. IV,
44 E.g., Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co., 227 N.Y. 531, 125 N.E. 675
(1920); The Linseed King, 48 F.2d 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); In re Spencer Kellogg
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Sec. 1; of the United States Constitution might require that full
faith and credit be given a compensation statute in such a case.45
Closely analogous to this question is that of the extent to
which the elimination of the employer's common law defenses,
as a result of noncompliance with the compensation statute of the
state where the regular employment is located, should be given
effect beyond the state. It is generally held that the provisions of
the compensation statutes, creating special rights of action in tort
and removing the employer's common law defenses, are effective
only as to torts committed within the state. 40 Creation of special
causes of action, and the elimination of defenses, it is said, are
matters touching delictual rights and liabilities, and, as such, are
governed by the law of the place where the tort occurred.4T In
Armburg v. Boston gc Maine R. R., 48 however, the Massachusetts
court adopted a contrary view. This case involved an injury to
the employee of a railroad, employed in Massachusetts, and in-
jured in intrastate commerce outside of Massachusetts. The rail-
road had not complied with the Massachusetts compensation act,
and was therefore liable to an action at law. The action was
brought in Massachusetts, and the court held that the provisions
of the Massachusetts act, abolishing common law defenses, was
applicable; and this position was sustained by the Supreme Court.4
This decision is apparently on the ground that abolition of common
law defenses is so annexed to the employment as to operate extra-
territorially, as would have the compensation provisions, had the
employer accepted the act.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF CLAIM IN A STATE NOT THE PLACE or INJURY
AND HAVING No CONTACT WITH THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION
Where neither the injury, nor any incidents of the employment
are within the state, in which the claim is sought to be enforced,
& Sons, 52 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1931). Contra: Farr v. Babcock Lumber Co., 182 N.C.
725, 109 S.E. 833 (1921).
45 Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
40 Osagera v.. Schiff, 293 Mo. 333, 240 S.W. 124 (1922); Black v. Stone &
Webster Engineering Co., 181 N.Y. Misc. 854, 49 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1943), Reynolds
v. Day, 79 Wash. 499, 140 rac. 681 (1914).
47 Ibid.
48 276 Mass. 418, 177 N.E. 665 (1932).
49 Boston & Maine R.R. v. Armburg, 285 U.S. 234 (1932).
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the compensation act of the forum will not be applied.50 If the
injury, under the laws of the state where it occurs, creates rights
under the compensation act of that state, to the exclusion of an
action of tort, that should be a conclusive defense to an action of
tort brought in the forum.51 If, however, the employee would have
a cause of action in tort under the lex loci delicti, and this would
not be barred by the exclusive provisions of the compensation act
of another state, then the employee's cause of action should be
enforced by the forum as it would enforce other transitory tort
claims. 2 When it is determined that the compensation act of
another state is applicable to the exclusion of a tort claim, the
employee's action will be dismissed, and jurisdiction will usually not
be exercised to hear his claim under the foreign compensation act.Z:
The reasons for this rule are well stated in Mosely v. Empire Gas
& Fuel Co.,54 where it was said:
"A transitory cause of action can be maintained in an-
other state even though the statute creating the cause of action
provides that the action must be brought in the local domestic
courts; the venue is no part of the right to recover damages
for personal injuries inflicted by common law negligence, and
a state cannot, under the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution, create a transitory cause of action
and at the same time destroy the right to sue on that transitory
cause of action in any state having jurisdiction. But those
rules are not controlling where the right to recover com-
pensation arises out of contract and the remedies, afforded by
the statute creating the cause of action, are exclusive, and both
the employer and employee have accepted the statute as part
G0 Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Goslin, 163 Md. 74, 160 AtI. 804 (1932);
Bement Oil Co. v. Cubbison, 84 Ind. App. 22, 149 N.E. 919 (1925); Freeman v.
Higgins, 123 Neb. 73, 242 N.W. 271 (1932); Hamm v. Rockwood Sprinkler Co.,
88 N.J.L. 564, 97 AtI. 730 (1916); RESTATEiUENT, CONFLICT OF LAwS § 400 (1934).
53 Singleton v. Hope Engineering Co., 223 Ala. 238, 137 So. 441 (1931);
Logan v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., 157 Ark. 528, 249 S.W. 21 (1923);
Mitchell v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 202 Mo. App. 610, 215 S.W. 506
(199. Contra: Johnson v. Caroline Co. & O.R.R., 191 N.C. 75, 131 S.E. 390
S2 Duskin v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Co., 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1948).
03 In spite of the difficulties inherent in the situation, five jurisdictions have
changed this rule by statute, and expressly provide that an employe, hired out-
side the state, might enforce the rights acquired under the law of the state of
hire before their commissions or courts. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 56-943 (1939);
IDAHO CODE § 72-615 (1949); UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-1-52 (1943); VT. STATS.
tit. 40, c. 353, § 8074 (1947); HAWAII REv. LAws § 7523 (1935). In all these
states but Utah, however, the rights must be capable of being reasonably
determined and dealt with by the local bodies.
54 313 Mo. 225, 281 S.W. 762 (1925).
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of their contract, and the statute prescribes a procedure for
adjusting the compensation, and tribunals for -enforcing the
right, entirely different from the proceedings of courts pro-
ceeding according to the course of the common law, and the
statute itself says that no action or proceeding under it can
be brought outside of the state. Where the statute creating
the right provides an exclusive remedy to be enforced in a
particular way, or before a particular tribunal, the aggrieved
party will be left to the remedy given by the statute which
creates the right."55
There is no question under these circumstances of denial of
full faith and credit to the public acts of sister states in violation
of the United States Constitution," since the Supreme Court has
held, where a provision for liability is coupled with a provision
for a special remedy to be administered by a designated tribunal
with certain specified power, the Federal Constitution does not
require the forum to exercise jurisdiction.57
V. THiRD PARTY LIuIILrrY
Another interesting problem, involving the extent to which
common law rights and liabilities have survived, is that concern-
ing third party liability. Injuries, not infrequently, occur for
which the employer would normally be liable to pay compensa-
tion, and with respect to which a suit for negligence may also lie
against some person other than the employer. In all but three
-states (New Hampshire, Ohio, and West Virginia) the compensa-
tion laws contain provisions regarding third party liability, and
in these three the courts recognize the right of the injured party to
sue the negligent person for damages. The statutes regulating
third party liability expressly authorize the bringing of actions by
employees entitled to compensation, and provide for subrogation
to the employee's rights in favor of the employer or insurer paying
compensation. When the injury occurs in a state, other than the
state of regular employment, the question arises concerning the
extent to which these provisions will receive extraterritorial en-
forcement. The problems that may be presented in this connec-
tion are many and difficult. Since this paper is primarily con-
cerned with problems involving the rights and liabilities existing
55 Id. at 226, 281 S.W. at 763.
56 Art. IV, § 1.
57 Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481 (1912); Pollard v.
Bailey, 20 Wall. 520 (U.S. 1874).
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2 [1953], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol55/iss2/5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
between the parties to the employment contract, no more than
this brief reference to the conflicts issues involved in subrogation
will be made. 8
VI. CHOICE OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws"
A. In the Absence of Constitutional or Statutory Requirements
The principles of conflict of laws as applied to workmen's
compensation will be seen fiom the foregoing to be in no very
orderly condition. The injured workman may find that he is
eligible to secure compensation for the same injury under more
than one act; utilization of one statute being based upon control
of the employment relationship in its inception and performance;
of the other, upon control at the time of injury. Apart from statu-
tory or constitutional prohibitions, it has generally been recognized
that the workman may seek recovery under either act,59 and in
some jurisdictions under both,60 with a deduction being made for
the first award. 01 If the compensation acts of all the states were
uniform, it would make little difference which act was determined
to apply. The acts differ widely, however, with respect to the type
of injury included, the defenses allowed, and the amounts recover-
able, so that the election of laws becomes very important.
To this point the choice of law problem in workmen's com-
pensation has been considered almost entirely on pure conflict of
laws principles, without giving much attention to the relevant
provisions of the United States Constitution. In recent years
several cases have been decided by the Supreme Court in this field.
The influence of these decisions on the choice of workmen's com-
pensation law will be discussed separately in a subsequent install-
ment of this article.
58 For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of third party liability
and subrogation undcr workmen's compensation see Campbell, Subrogation
Under Workmen's Compensation Too Much or Too Little, 18 CHI-KENT L. Rv.
225 (1940).
0 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939); American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. McCaffrey, 37 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 751 (1930); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 402(1934).
00 McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217, 174 N.E. 338 (1931); McKesson-
Fuller-Morrison Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 212 Wis. 507, 250 N.W. 396 (1933);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLicr OF LAws § 403 (1934).
01 Industrial Accident Comm'n of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622
(1947).
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